identityservicesd, the daemon that vouches for you
identityservicesd carries Apple Account and iMessage identity on your Mac. Measured live: its firewall strings, its alerts, and what its CPU costs.
By Chethan Kumar S N · Updated
Of all the lowercase daemons in Activity Monitor, identityservicesd has the most reassuring name in the list. Identity, services, d for daemon. The job description is right there: this is the process that provides identity services. When your Mac proves to Apple that it is really your Mac, when your phone number lights up for iMessage, when a FaceTime call rings on four devices at once, when a new device joins your account and a warning appears, this is the daemon underneath it.
People rarely meet it on purpose. They meet it in a CPU column on a warm evening, or in a firewall dialog that names it, or in a notification about a new device they did not add, and then they search for it. What they find is years of forum threads asking the same three questions with no measurements in them. This page has measurements. It was built the way the other process pages in this series are built, from the daemon’s own launch configuration, its own logs and the resource files that ship inside its bundle, measured read only on one Mac running macOS 27.0.1 on Apple silicon. Every command is at the end if you want to repeat any of it.
No manual page, and the biggest binary in this series
Unlike suggestd, netbiosd and routined, this daemon ships with no manual page at all. man identityservicesd finds nothing. So the receipts here come from elsewhere, and the binary itself is a good start. It is 30,744,768 bytes, which makes it by far the heaviest daemon measured in this series: about 2.7 times the size of mediaanalysisd, the machine learning daemon that was the previous record holder, and roughly seventy times installd, the installer daemon. It carries 58,055 readable strings. It is built for arm64e only, with no Intel slice, the same shape as apsd. It is signed by Apple, marked Platform 26, and the signature is dated 9 August 2026.
It also does something almost no other daemon in this series does: it ships as a full application bundle, identityservicesd.app, tucked inside the private IDS framework. The bundle’s Resources folder holds localisation tables for more than forty languages and three icons of its own, labelled FaceTime, iCloud and IDS. That trio is the honest mission statement. This daemon does not know about window management or files. It knows about accounts, messages and calls.
It runs as your own user, not root, with parent process 1, which means launchd started it. It has run exactly once, since boot, and has never exited: 27 days and 22 hours at the time of measurement. Total processor time in that stretch: 7 minutes and 29 seconds, which works out to about sixteen seconds a day, practically the same cost as routined. Memory was 19 MB in the first sample and 21 MB in a second taken twelve minutes later. It also sets an environment flag asking the memory allocator to be space-efficient, which tells you Apple expects many copies of small things inside it.
What it actually does all day
The framework name, IDS, is Apple’s identity layer for messaging. The daemon registers your Apple Account and phone number for iMessage and FaceTime, keeps the encryption keys that go with them, tracks the list of devices on your account, and shuttles identity questions between apps and Apple’s servers.
The neighbours make the division of labour clear. In six hours of logs measured for the apsd page in this series, 51 distinct processes connected to the push daemon, and identityservicesd was one of them, carrying iMessage. It is a client of the push network, not the network itself. On the accounts side, the opendirectoryd page in this series caught it holding references to the local directory node, because identity questions eventually come down to asking who a user is. It offers nine Mach services of its own, with plain names that describe the work: one for push, one for queries, a pair of authenticated endpoints for desktop apps, an endpoint for simulator phones, and one whose name ends in firewall, which we will get to.
Its launch configuration is deliberately uninteresting: keep it alive, mark it interactive so it responds promptly, no scheduled naps. It is one of the few daemons in this series with pressured exit explicitly disabled, meaning launchd will not reclaim its memory when the machine gets busy. A daemon whose whole job is answering “is this really you” is not allowed to be slow to wake.
The firewall in its own name
Search for this daemon and the word firewall and you will find confusion, because there are two firewalls and neither article explains the other one.
The first is the network firewall in System Settings. When it names a process in a dialog about incoming connections, it is doing its job: asking you whether a program should listen for connections. The message identity stack does maintain long-lived connections, push and peer-to-peer both, so the question can come up.
The second firewall is the daemon’s own, and it is far more interesting. Inside the bundle sits a localisation file for it with 132 English strings, and they read like a security operations log for your social life:
An unknown contact attempted to send an iMessage.
An unknown contact attempted to FaceTime.
Lockdown Mode blocked FaceTime Audio
Lockdown Mode blocked Apple Pay request
Lockdown Mode blocked Screen Sharing
%@ attempted to share a password or passkey.
%@ attempted to start a Check In.
%@ invited you to a Shared Photo Stream.
This is the screen behind Lockdown Mode’s message warnings. When Lockdown Mode blocks a message attachment, or when someone who is not in your contacts tries to start a FaceTime call or share their location, the wording of the notification comes from this file, and the daemon ships a whole notification delegate service named after its firewall to deliver them. A companion file holds the wording for the sharpest case, with seven strings including a title, Malicious Message Detected, and the prompt that follows it: sharing the message will help Apple investigate the attack and protect against future ones. These strings exist because the attacks they describe are real. They are also the strongest signal of what this daemon is for: it stands between your identity and everyone who tries to use it.
The notifications you have actually seen
Another file in the bundle holds 158 notification strings, and you will recognise several immediately. There is a title, Device Added to Your Account. There is a family of lines built from it:
Your phone number is now being used for iMessage on a new Mac.
A device now has access to iCloud, iMessage, and FaceTime.
If you don't recognize this device you can remove it in System Settings.
One template per device type: iPhone, iPad, Mac, Apple Watch, Apple TV, HomePod, iPod touch. This is the new device sign-in warning, one of the most-searched notifications in the Apple world, and its words live inside this daemon. When a new device activates iMessage or FaceTime on your account, this is the process that knows, because registration is its job, and this is the process that tells you, in its own words.
Seven maintenance jobs, watched live
The daemon’s launch configuration registers seven scheduled maintenance activities with names like a checklist: clean the query database, file the daily metric report, track registration state, clean up sender keys, attempt account repair, check the PDS store. Most run daily, the metric report on account status runs every twelve hours, and account repair runs every four hours, which tells you how Apple feels about half-broken sign-ins. The cleanest detail is a gate on the last one: it refuses to run on battery.
Better than the schedule is watching one fire. Thirty minutes of logs on the measured Mac held 2,615 lines, the chattiest daemon measured in this series, nearly apsd’s pace, and among them was the daily cleanup, live:
Beginning cleanup of outgoing message database
Beginning cleanup of outgoing message database for messages older
than 2 days past enqueue date
Ending cleanup of 0 outgoing message database
Cleaning last resort DB with date range Sun Oct 18 10:39:36 2026
to Thu Dec 17 10:39:36 2026
A message database with a two-day expiry, and an identity cache swept on a rolling sixty-day window, both tidied in milliseconds. The rest of the chatter was radio work: short bursts of Bluetooth advertising for Continuity, fourteen bytes at a time with rotating addresses, started and stopped every second or two, plus the push daemon setting constrained topics, and session cleanup whenever a client process dies: Cleaning up session(s) for client ID ... because it died. None of this cost anything. The process sat at 0.0 percent CPU through both samples.
The wall around its own data
Ask for the daemon’s database directly and the system answers for it: listing ~/Library/IdentityServices returns Operation not permitted, the same privacy wall suggestd’s stores sit behind. The keys, device records and registration state it keeps are locked to itself, and no tool run as your user will read them. Crash reports, both the per-user folder and the system one, hold nothing filed under its name in 27 days.
And if you count three of these processes in Activity Monitor, two of them are not real Macs. The measured machine runs the iOS 27.0 and 27.1 simulator runtimes, and each ships its own copy of the daemon for its pretend phone, visible in the process list under the simulator runtime paths. The desktop daemon even offers a simulator bridge endpoint, named sim2host, for talking to them. The real one has parent process 1. The others stop when the simulator does.
What Apple says, and does not say
Apple’s Mac User Guide, fetched whole for this series, mentions this daemon zero times, the same silence it keeps around every daemon in this series. The pages that describe what it does are all there: signing in with an Apple Account, setting up iMessage and FaceTime, Continuity, Lockdown Mode. None of them names the process. That is the pattern of the whole series: the features are documented, the machinery is not, and the gap between the two is exactly where worry grows. The receipts on this page, the strings, the schedule, the live cleanup, are the machinery’s own words.
No overlap with its neighbours
This is the third page in a chain, and each link owns one thing. apsd owns the transport: the always-on connection that carries pushes to every app. opendirectoryd owns the accounts database: the local store of users and groups. identityservicesd owns the identity layer above both: Apple Account registration, iMessage and FaceTime keys, the device list, and the attack screen that guards them. If your question is why messages arrive, read about apsd. If it is who may log in to this Mac, read about opendirectoryd. If it is who your Mac claims to be when it talks to Apple, you are on the right page.
See for yourself
Every claim above came from commands like these, all read only:
$ ps -Awwo pid,ppid,user,%cpu,rss,etime,time,args | grep "[/]identityservicesd"
$ plutil -p /System/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.identityservicesd.plist
$ launchctl print gui/$(id -u)/com.apple.identityservicesd | grep -E "runs|last exit|immediate"
$ ls -l /System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/IDS.framework/identityservicesd.app/Contents/MacOS/
$ codesign -dv /System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/IDS.framework/identityservicesd.app
$ ls /System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/IDS.framework/identityservicesd.app/Contents/Resources/
$ ls ~/Library/IdentityServices
$ log show --last 30m --predicate 'process == "identityservicesd"' --style compact
$ ls ~/Library/Logs/DiagnosticReports/ /Library/Logs/DiagnosticReports/ | grep -i identity
The localisation tables are the ones to read. Two files of plain text, one telling your Mac how to warn you about strangers, one telling it how to tell you a new device just joined your account, both sitting quietly beside a 30 MB binary that has no manual page.
Questions
What is identityservicesd on Mac?
It is the daemon behind Apple Account identity on a Mac: the process that registers your phone number and Apple Account for iMessage and FaceTime, keeps the keys and device list that go with them, and carries the identity side of Continuity features. It runs as your own user account, not root, and lives inside the IDS framework in a bundle of its own. On the Mac measured here, a MacBook Pro on macOS 27.0.1, it has been running since boot without exiting once and costs about sixteen seconds of processor time a day at around 20 MB of memory. It has no manual page, which is unusual for a daemon this central, so this page was built from its own configuration, its own logs and the resource files that ship beside it, all read only.
Why is identityservicesd using so much CPU?
Usually it is not, for long. The measured cost here is sixteen seconds of processor time a day, and the process sat at 0.0 percent in both samples taken while writing this page. What makes it feel busy is how chatty it is: 2,615 log lines in thirty minutes, the most of any daemon measured in this series, most of them radio work and bookkeeping. Real bursts line up with real events: signing in to an Apple Account, a phone number finishing iMessage registration, a network change that forces the message transport to reconnect, or one of its seven daily maintenance jobs. Sustained high CPU for an hour on an idle Mac would be unusual, and in 27 days on the measured machine it never happened once.
Why does identityservicesd show up in my firewall settings?
There are two firewalls involved and they are not the same thing. The one in System Settings is the network firewall, and its dialog asks whether an application should accept incoming connections. If that dialog named this process, it is asking about the daemon's push and peer connections. The other firewall is the daemon's own: its resources include a file of 132 notification strings for an IDS firewall that screens message attacks, with wording like An unknown contact attempted to send an iMessage and Lockdown Mode blocked FaceTime Audio. That is the screen behind the warnings people see when Lockdown Mode blocks something. Neither appearance means the daemon is misbehaving; one is a network question, the other is a warning you were meant to see.
My Mac said my phone number is being used for iMessage on a new device. Is that this daemon?
Yes, down to the words on the screen. The daemon's own resources hold the notification templates: Device Added to Your Account, then Your phone number is now being used for iMessage on a new Mac, with variants for iPhone, iPad, Apple Watch, Apple TV and HomePod, and the closing line If you don't recognize this device you can remove it in System Settings. That warning exists because enabling iMessage or FaceTime on a new device is exactly what an attacker with your password would do. If the device is yours, the notification needs nothing from you. If it is not, the daemon's own advice is the right move: open System Settings, find the device under your Apple Account, and remove it, then change the password.
Why are there three identityservicesd processes on my Mac?
Almost certainly because Xcode simulators are installed. On the Mac measured here there were three: one with parent process 1, which is the real one launchd started at boot, and two more whose paths run through the iOS simulator runtimes, one for iOS 27.0 and one for 27.1. The desktop daemon even offers a Mach service named desktop.sim2host for talking to those pretend phones. The simulator copies are the same daemon built for iOS, doing the same job inside a simulated device, and they stop when the simulator does. If you have never installed Xcode there should be exactly one, and its parent should be 1.
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